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One fascinating question concerning labour 
activism in contemporary China regards the 
attitude of Chinese migrant workers towards 
the law. In recent years, much has been 
written about the ‘rights awakening’ (quanli 
de juexing) of Chinese workers. But what 
kind of rights are we talking about? Do they 
respond to an entirely subjective concept of 
justice or do they somehow coincide with 
the entitlements provided by the labour 
legislation? And what is the relationship 
that binds legal awareness (falü yishi), rights 
consciousness (quanli yishi), and solidarity 
(tuanjie yishi)? That these elements do not 
necessarily go hand in hand is highlighted by 
the following testimony by a labour activist 
whom I interviewed in Shenzhen in 2014: 
If ten [young migrants] come to me saying 
that their rights have been violated, they 
usually want to sue the company, but don’t 
know how. Although I suggest that they sue 
the company together, they generally choose 
to do it separately. I don’t think of this as a 
contradiction. If legal consciousness and 
solidarity consciousness are so low, how can 
they have such a high awareness of rights 
protection (weiquan yishi)? For example, if 
one of their fathers had his rights violated, he 
would choose to stay silent. If the son has his 
rights violated, he will explode and fight. If 
he didn’t sign a labour contract and gets fired, 
he will ask for double wage as compensation. 
But they don’t know anything about these 
compensations, they only know that their 
bosses have deceived them.
[Interview, Shenzhen, October 2014]
It is with these and other questions in mind 
that a few years ago I undertook a survey among 
the employees of nine Italian metal mechanic 
factories (either joint ventures or wholly 
foreign owned enterprises) in three Chinese 
cities: Shenzhen, Yangzhou, and Chongqing. 
In three rounds of interviews—respectively in 
2012, 2014, and 2015— I was able to conduct 
1,379 questionnaires at the gates of the 
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various factories, without any knowledge or 
interference by the management. The workers 
in my sample were mostly men (74.2 per cent); 
24.5 per cent of them were born before 1980, 
45.4 per cent in the Eighties, and 30.1 per 
cent in the Nineties; and their educational 
level was medium-high, with 32.7 per cent of 
the workers having graduated from middle 
school, 22.1 per cent from high school, 20.2 
per cent from middle technical school, and 
18.9 per cent from higher technical school.
Were all these workers migrants? Actually, 
only 63.7 per cent of the respondents had a 
rural household registration (nongye hukou), 
the traditional parameter to determine a 
worker’s status as an internal migrant. Still, 
taking the hukou as a parameter that defines 
the identity of Chinese workers today may be 
quite treacherous, as many ‘urban’ employees 
of the factories in Chongqing and peri-urban 
Yangzhou were local farmers whose status 
had been ‘upgraded’ following the new 
policies of forced urbanisation adopted by the 
local authorities. Similarly, only thirty-three 
per cent of the workers came from a different 
province—with the significant exception of 
Shenzhen, where only 11.3 per cent of the 
workers were from Guangdong—a finding 
that mirrors the growing importance of intra-
provincial migrations in China.
In my survey, I attempted to measure 
the awareness of these workers regarding 
some key aspects of labour law, as well as 
their expectations towards wages and work 
hours. Yet in this article I will focus on three 
questions: how do Chinese workers perceive 
the labour contract? How much do they 
know about labour legislation and how does 
this knowledge affect their trust of the law? 
What do they think about going on strike as a 
strategy to protect their rights? 
At the cornerstone of the discourse of the 
party-state on ‘harmonious labour relations’ 
(hexie laodong guanxi), labour contracts can 
provide some interesting insights on the way 
Chinese workers relate to the labour law 
and the relevant propaganda. 97.2 per cent 
of the workers in my survey had signed an 
individual labour contract, a clear proof of the 
commitment of the authorities to enforce the 
labour contract system, at least in the industry 
I considered (in other sectors, for instance 
the construction sector, the rate is remarkably 
lower, and according to official data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics in 2015 only 36.2 
per cent of all migrant workers had signed a 
labour contract with their employer). But how 
many workers believed in the importance of 
the contract as an instrument to protect their 
rights? A question I asked is whether the 
workers had read the clauses of the contract 
before signing it. Only 26.7 per cent of them 
had read them carefully (zixi yuedu), while 
46.5 per cent just had had a quick look (suibian 
kan), and 26.8 per cent had signed without 
reading (qianming eryi). This seems to display 
a certain disinterest in the labour contract, 
as if it were an irrelevant piece of paper. Yet, 
when directly asked whether they considered 
contracts as an effective tool to protect their 
rights, 22.3 per cent of the workers responded 
affirmatively (keyi) and 49.2 per cent was 
relatively optimistic (hai keyi), compared 
with only 7.3 per cent who expressed disbelief 
(bu keyi), and 21.2 per cent who did not know 
how to answer. In essence, almost two thirds 
of the workers trusted the capacity of labour 
contracts to protect them.
I then asked whom they thought was the 
main beneficiary of a labour contract. Although 
the Labour Contract Law that came into force 
in 2008 is rather favourable to workers when 
it comes to the resolution and severance of 
labour relations, somehow unsurprisingly 
82.5 per cent of the respondents believed that 
a labour contract benefitted both employer 
and employee, while only 3.5 per cent declared 
that the worker was the one to benefit the 
most. Still, there was a significant minority of 
workers (12.8 per cent) who believed that the 
Labour Contracts
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labour contract benefitted only the company. 
This was because in the eyes of some workers 
a labour contract is a significant restraint to 
mobility, and mobility—i.e. ‘voting with your 
feet’ (yi jiao toupiao)—often is the only way 
to resist corporate exploitation. As a migrant 
worker whom I interviewed in 2011 for the 
documentary Dreamwork China said:
A contract? It is like this: if you sign it, you 
cannot leave for the next three months. If 
you don’t sign it, you can leave whenever you 
want, even before a month. If it is an annual 
contract, you have to work for at least three 
months or you cannot quit. This is the labour 
contract. [Interview, Shenzhen, January 2011]
  
 This relative confidence in labour contracts 
opens some further questions about how 
Chinese workers perceive the labour law. 
Without going into too much detail, I found 
that the workers in my sample to have a 
selective knowledge of the provisions of the 
labour legislation, exemplified by the 1995 
Labour Law and the 2008 Labour Contract 
Law. In particular, they were very aware of 
clauses that affected their direct economic 
interests—such as those that regulate the way 
overtime wages are calculated (90.6 per cent 
of the workers were aware)—while knowing 
very little about other aspects of the labour 
legislation, which they probably perceived as 
less relevant to their income. For instance, just 
17.5 per cent of the workers knew that they 
were supposed to work no more than thirty-
six hours of overtime a month. Similarly, 
only 25.1 per cent of the workers could write 
down the correct local minimum wage (on 
the whole, though, I found that the higher a 
worker’s basic wage, the less likely he/she is to 
know the correct minimum wage). Even more 
important, I found a clear divide between the 
knowledge of individual rights—generally low 
but still existing—and that of collective rights. 
Many workers had no clear idea about what a 
trade union is (11.4 per cent had never heard 
the word ‘trade union’ before), and 98.2 per 
cent of the respondents had no idea of what 
‘collective negotiation’ (jiti xieshang)—the 
Chinese watered-down version of collective 
bargaining—was.  
 In spite of (or maybe due to) this highly 
selective knowledge, when I asked the workers 
whether they believed that the existing labour 
legislation was able to protect them, most of 
them were quite optimist. 5.7 per cent were 
absolutely sure that it could (wanquan neng) 
and 49.6 per cent were slightly less sure, but 
still quite positive about it (yinggai keyi). 
On the contrary, 34.1 per cent were dubious 
(yexu neng) and 10.5 per cent were definitely 
sceptical (bu neng). If these results display 
a considerable confidence in the law, it is 
interesting that this perception does not 
derive from a personal experience with the 
Chinese legal system. In fact, only 3.3 per cent 
of the workers in the sample had dealt with 
a labour dispute by legal means before. This 
apparently confirms what Mary Gallagher and 
Yuhua Wang found out in a previous study, 
that ‘non-users [of the legal system] tend to 
have vague but benevolent notions of the legal 
system and its effectiveness’ (Gallagher and 
Wang 2011, 204). 
   
 
How do strikes figure within such a 
‘benevolent notion’ of the legal system? 
My survey shows that trusting the law and 
resorting to strikes are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. While China has ratified 
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, which at article 
8.1 (d) binds the government to ensure ‘the 
right to strike, provided that it is exercised 
in conformity with the laws of the particular 
country’, the Chinese legislation does not 
mention the right to strike at all, consigning 
Legal Knowledge and 
Trust towards the Law
Perception of Strikes
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it to a grey area (Chang and Cooke 2015). 
Since even Chinese scholars have not reached 
a conclusion on the legality of industrial 
actions in China, I therefore did not expect 
the workers to have a clear idea on this issue. 
Yet, when I asked them whether they believed 
that going on strike was legal or illegal, I was 
surprised to find out that 38.5 per cent of the 
respondents said that it was legal, compared 
with only 13.9 per cent who believed the 
opposite (the rest did not know). That such 
a high percentage of workers expressed the 
belief that strikes are legal is quite impressive. 
It means that many workers in China believe 
that the law—and therefore the apparatus 
of the party-state—will support them in the 
event of a strike. This may be taken as a hint 
of the extent to which the work of propaganda 
and legal dissemination undertaken by the 
Chinese authorities in the past two decades 
has succeeded.
 Still, the idea that going on strike is ‘legal’ 
does not mean that Chinese workers are 
willing to protest at the slightest perceived 
violation of their rights. The right to strike is 
often framed by the workers in moral rather 
than legal terms, as a last resort after all other 
avenues of redress have failed. As a young 
respondent said: ‘In a situation in which 
there is no choice other than going on strike, 
you cannot say that it is illegal. Still, the 
workers do not want to go on strike without 
reason’ [Interview, Shenzhen, April 2012]. 
Nevertheless, when I asked what they thought 
about going on strike as a strategy to protect 
their rights, 43.3 per cent of the respondents 
were either favourable or extremely 
favourable, compared with only 26.8 per cent 
who were against or absolutely against it (29.8 
per cent did not know).
 
  
The data presented in this article show 
that when discussing the ‘rights awakening’ 
of Chinese workers it is important to 
consider what we mean by the term ‘rights’. 
In particular, more attention should be paid 
to the way these workers respond to the 
official discourse on labour rights promoted 
by the party-state through the labour law and 
other relevant policy documents. As I have 
attempted to show, the official discourse 
is deeply rooted in the mind of the workers 
in my sample. This can been seen in two 
respects: the workers’ conviction that labour 
contracts and the labour law can protect them; 
and their selective knowledge of the labour 
law provisions, strongly unbalanced towards 
individual rights with direct economic 
implications. This ‘benevolent notion’ of the 
legal system even affects the perception of 
strikes, which are considered ‘legal’ by a very 
significant portion of the workforce. This 
means that many Chinese workers believe that 
the apparatus of the party-state will support 
them in their decision to go on strike—at least 
as long as they have a ‘reasonable’ motivation 
to do so. If these findings do not provide 
a definite answer to the wider theoretical 
questions outlined at the beginning of the 
article, they nonetheless warrant some further 
attention when discussing the ‘awakening’ of 
the Chinese working class.
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